Tag: lawyers

Οι συνέπειες της αφαίρεσης του αρχιτέκτονα στη ρήτρα διαιτησίας

Posted on | by Paschalis Paschali

Στο πρόσφατο του άρθρο, ο Θεόδουλος Δημητρίου, Partner, IOANNIDES DEMETRIOU LLC, αναλύει τις συνέπειες αφαίρεσης του αρχιτέκτονα στην ρήτρα διαιτησίας.

ΟΙ-ΣΥΝΕΠΕΙΕΣ-ΤΗΣ-ΑΦΑΙΡΕΣΗΣ-ΤΟΥ-ΑΡΧΙΤΕΚΤΟΝΑ-ΣΤΗΝ-ΡΗΤΡΑ-ΔΙΑΙΤΗΣΙΑΣ—Θ-ΔΗΜΗΤΡΙΟΥ-IDLAW-1Download

Μπορείτε να βρείτε το κείμενο της απόφασης ημερομηνίας 19.8.2024 στην Αγωγή 2604/2023 του Επαρχιακού Δικαστηρίου Λεμεσού, την οποία χειρίστηκε επιτυχώς το γραφείο IOANNIDES DEMETRIOU LLC, και στην οποία εκπροσωπήσαμε τον εργολάβο, στον ακόλουθο σύνδεσμο: https://www.idlaw.com.cy/wpcontent/uploads/2024/08/2604-2023-19-8-
2024.pdf

Για να λαμβάνεται άμεση ενημέρωση για τα άρθρα των δικηγόρων του Ιωαννίδης Δημητρίου Δ.Ε.Π.Ε, ακολουθείστε την σελίδα μας στο LinkedIn.

The Implementation of Telework Law Framework

Posted on | by Paschalis Paschali
The implementation of the remote working law framework. Article by Irene Kattami, Senior Associate at Ioannides Demetriou LLC

The landscape of work has undergone significant transformation in recent years, which was particularly accelerated by the global pandemic. Teleworking has become increasingly common, prompting the need for a clear legislative framework to govern its implementation. This need has been addressed with the House of Representatives’ approval of a comprehensive framework regulating remote working. The Framework for Telework of 2023 Legislation (the “Law”), which came into effect on December 1, 2023, aims to establish guidelines and protections for both employers and employees navigating the remote work environment.

The Law stipulates that teleworking can be implemented under the following circumstances: (i) an optional teleworking scheme may be adopted subject to a written agreement entered into between the employer and the employee, (ii) mandatory teleworking may be imposed under a Decree issued by the Minister of Health due to public health considerations and (iii) mandatory teleworking may be required for an employee whose health is demonstrably at risk, which can be mitigated by refraining from working on the employer’s premises.

Apart from prescribing the conditions under which teleworking can be established, the Law also delineates the responsibilities that the employer bears towards the employee. Firstly, among these obligations is the coverage of expenses incurred by the employee related to teleworking. These expenses include various aspects, such as equipment costs (unless agreed to utilize the employer’s equipment), telecommunications, usage of the home workspace, and the maintenance and repair of equipment. Moreover, the employer bears the responsibility of ensuring that the employee receives the essential technical support required for their work. To further regulate the financial aspects, the Minister of Labour and Social Insurance is expected to issue a Decree specifying the minimum teleworking cost payable to the employee. Importantly, the Law stipulates that any expenses covered by employers will not be considered as part of the employee’s remuneration, but they are deemed as deductible expenses, exempted from both social insurance and taxation.

In maintaining consistency with the aforementioned responsibilities, the employer is obliged, among other things and in addition to those outlined in the Occupational Safety and Health Law 1996 to (i) have at their disposal a suitable and sufficient written risk assessment of the existing teleworking risks, (ii) determine the preventive and protective measures to be taken based on the written risk assessment, (iii) provide such information, instructions, and training to ensure the safety and health of their employees. Employers have the same health and safety responsibilities for employees, whether they work from home or in a workplace.

Furthermore, the Law requires that employers should provide certain information to employees regarding teleworking, within eight (8) days from the date of commencement of such arrangement. This information includes:
a) The employee’s right to disconnect;
b) An analysis of the extend of teleworking costs incurred by the employer;
c) The equipment necessary for the provision of services remotely and the procedures in place for the technical support, maintenance and repair of the equipment;
d) Any restrictions on the use of the equipment and any penalties in case of violation of the restrictions;
e) The agreement regarding remote readiness, it’s time limits and the response deadlines of the teleworking employee;
f) An evaluation of the risks associated with remote work and measures taken by the employer for their prevention based on the risk assessment;
g) The responsibility to protect and secure the professional and personal data of the teleworking employee and the relevant procedure to comply with such obligation;
h) The supervisor from whom the teleworker will receive instructions.

Any information which does not have to be personalised and addressed to teleworking employees, can be communicated to appropriate personnel through the employer’s internal policies.

Employees engaged in teleworking have the equivalent rights and obligations as their counterparts working on-site at the employer’s premises, including rights or obligations concerning their workload, assessment criteria and procedures, compensation, access to employer-related information, training, professional development, and where applicable trade union activity including their unhindered and confidential communication with trade union representatives.

A key protection established by the Law is the employees’ right to disconnect in order for the provisions of the Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions Law to be implemented. Employers and employees’ representatives are required to agree on the technical and organizational methods to ensure that remote employees can disconnect from electronic communication without any adverse consequences. If no such agreement is reached, employers must still notify employees of this right.
Moreover, the Law also sets out the duties and powers of Inspectors, who are officials of the Ministry and/or other public servants appointed by the Minister of Labour and Social Insurance. Their primary responsibility is to ensure the thorough and effective enforcement of the provisions of the Law. Failure to comply with the provisions of the Law could render employers liable, with potential fines upon conviction not exceeding €10.000.

In conclusion, the Framework for Telework of 2023 represents a significant step towards formalizing and protecting the evolving landscape of remote work. This legislation not only establishes clear guidelines and responsibilities for both employers and employees but also ensures a fair and supportive environment for teleworking. By addressing key aspects such as expense coverage, health and safety requirements, and the right to disconnect, the Law aims to create a balanced framework that promotes productivity while safeguarding employee well-being. As teleworking becomes an integral part of the modern work environment, the effective implementation and adherence to this framework will be crucial in fostering a sustainable and equitable remote working culture.

Another win for SAPA

Posted on | by Paschalis Paschali

Client Alert: IOANNIDES DEMETRIOU LLC has achieved a significant win for its client, the Paphos Sewerage Board (SAPA) in the arbitration relating to the claim raised by the Saur-Iacovou JV consortium on 12/03/22 based on article 19.1 of the contract for the Operation and Maintenance of the Paphos Sewerage Board Biological Unit. located in Achelia, which involved an additional payment of €2,400,000 until the end of the 8- year contract. A final decision has been issued by the arbitrator Mr. Costas Clerides (former Attorney General of the Republic of Cyprus) which rejected the said claim in its entirety and awarded the legal costs of the Paphos Sewerage Board as the successful party to the proceedings.

View Paphos mayor Mr. Phedon Phedonos’ release here.

The case was handled by our Director, Demetris Kronides.

Liquidated damages in construction contracts

Posted on | by Paschalis Paschali

Client Alert: Ioannides Demetriou LLC has scored an important victory for its client, the University of Cyprus, in a bitterly contested interim order application by a contractor seeking to restrain the University (as employer in the contract) from deducting liquidated damages for delay under the contract. The contract was the standard Cyprus public sector construction contract.

The Applicant contractor claimed that the contract had become “time at large” due to the fact that the employer had failed to respond to an application for extension of time and had also given instructions for additional works after the contractual date for completion of the works.

The judgment provides both contractors and public sector employers with guidance as to the legal considerations that may influence a Court in relation to issues such as requests for an extension of time, the liquidated damages clause and the role of KEAA in the standardised construction contract for public works. The court adopted a common sense approach and emphasised the need for both contractor and the employer to comply with the terms of the contract in so far as the submission of claims and their evaluation is concerned.

The case was handled by our Senior Associate, Anna P. Christou

Links to judgment: pp.1-10 / pp.11-20 / pp.21-30

Χρόνος στα Κατασκευαστικά Συμβόλαια

Posted on | by Paschalis Paschali

Μια σύμβαση εργολαβίας, όσο περίπλοκη και αν είναι, είναι ουσιαστικά μια συμφωνία μεταξύ
ενός εργοδότη / ιδιοκτήτη και του εργολάβου, σύμφωνα με την οποία, σε αντάλλαγμα για το
ποσό της σύμβασης, ο εργολάβος συμφωνεί με τον εργοδότη / ιδιοκτήτη να εκτελέσει τις
εργασίες για μια σταθερή ή προσδιορίσιμη τιμή, εντός καθορισμένου χρόνου, στην ποιότητα
που ορίζεται στη σύμβαση, όπως εύλογα καθορίζεται από τον Αρχιτέκτονα / Μηχανικό /
Εργοδότη / εκπρόσωπο του Εργοδότη, ανάλογα με την περίπτωση.


Επομένως, ο χρόνος είναι ένα σημαντικό στοιχείο σε μια κατασκευαστική σύμβαση. Είναι
τόσο σημαντικός όσο το χρήμα.


Είναι επίσης η πιο κοινή πηγή διαφορών.

Διαβάστε πιο κάτω την μελέτη με τίτλο: Χρόνος στα Κατασκευαστικά Συμβόλαια του Ανδρέα Δημητρίου, Διευθύνων Σύμβουλος, Ioannides Demetriou LLC:

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Illegal purpose contracts: Can they ever be enforced under Cyprus Law? – Understanding the “illegality defence”

Posted on | by Paschalis Paschali

“No Court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or illegal act” said Lord Mansfield CJ in Holman v Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp 341, and marked the Cyprus legal framework around illegality in contracts up to the present date. The principle was redefined in the case of Tinsley v Millingan [1994] 1 AC 340 where the so called “reliance test” was established, essentially providing that if a Claimant needs to rely upon an illegal act in order to advance his claim, then that claim should be rejected. Also known as the common law principle of “ex turpi causa non oritur actio” (meaning “no action can arise from an illegal act”), this maxim usually presents itself as the “defence of illegality”, which is invoked by Defendants so as to argue that the claim against them should not succeed as it is based upon an illegal act.

The case of Christodoulou and others v Antonius H.F.M. Vraets, Civ.Appeal No. 329/2006, is a good example of how Cyprus Courts react to the invocation of this defence. In that case, the Claimant, claimed that he was entitled to the recovery of the amount of $856.000 which he paid as part of an agreement between himself and Defendants 1 and 2. The agreement considered the purchase of rough diamonds from Africa, which would subsequently be sold to the black market and would be exported from Angola to Belgium for processing. All three parties would divide the proceeds from the sale of the processed diamonds.  The Claimant brought an action against both Defendants, as after the payment of the amount above he received no percentage from the sale of the processed diamonds. Defendant 1 attempted to rely on the “illegality defence” and subsequently alleged that since the agreement between the parties was carried out for an illegal purpose, the Court could not “lend its aid” to a man whose cause of action was based on an illegal contract and therefore the Claimant was not entitled to recover his money. The Cyprus Court of Appeal, based their reasoning on the cases of Holman v Johnson and Tinsley v Millingan above and upheld the Defendant’s argument. It was essentially held that since the Claimant was aware of and participated in the illegality of the transaction, he was not entitled to the recovery of his money.

The case of Andronikou v Mavropoulou and another, Civ. Appeal No. 14/2014 is also relevant. In this case, the Claimant brought an action against the Defendant and his daughter for fraud, false representation, deceit and unjust enrichment. The Claimant contended that she had made an agreement with the Defendant, that she would pay him an amount of money, which the Defendant subsequently would pay to certain “key officials” of a developing company so as to persuade them to buy the Claimant’s land. The Claimant’s land was indeed acquired by the developing company but the Defendant took the money and placed them to his daughter’s account instead. The first instance court held that the Claimant was entitled to the return of her money. The Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeal’s decision was not unanimous. It was held by majority that it was evident that the agreement between the parties was signed for an illegal purpose, namely bribery. The Court could not therefore “lend its aid” to the Claimant and hence the latter was not entitled to the recovery of her money.

Remarkably enough, the Court of Appeal accepted in both cases cited above that the Claimant and the Defendants were “in pari delicto”, meaning “in equal fault” regarding the signing of the illegal contract. Yet despite the above finding, the Court held that the Claimants were not entitled to the recovery of their property, the inevitable result of their decision being that the property remained to the Defendants’ possession.

The following questions subsequently arise: If it is accepted that both parties have contributed equally to the illegality of the contract, why is it acceptable for one party to retain the property and not for the other? Why do we consider it unacceptable for the Claimant to recover his property because of his misconduct, while, the Defendant who is culpable of the same misconduct, is often allowed to keep the property?

Although it is evident that this strict approach aims at encouraging morality and ethos in every-day transactions, it is doubtful whether it represents the common sense of justice given the “paradox” results that is sometimes creates.

The UK Courts did not fail to notice the “anomalies” created by the strict application of the “illegality defence” and completely changed their approach as to its application in 2016 with the adjudication of the case of Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42. The Claimant in this case transferred an amount of money to the Defendant intending the latter to trade in shares in the Royal Bank of Scotland using insider information that he anticipated receiving. Neither the insider information, nor the purchase of shares ever materialized. When the Claimant brought an action against the Defendant, the Defendant attempted to rely on the “illegality defence” and argued that the Claimant could not recover his money as trading by using insider information is illegal. The Supreme Court held that the Claimant was entitled to the recovery of his money and that in fact, there is no reason for a party who manages to prove that he is capable of recovering his property on the basis of unjust enrichment, not to do so, just because the monies were paid to the Defendant for an illegal purpose. Additionally, the Supreme Court, held that in applying the “illegality defence” the following three considerations need to be taken into account: a)what is the purpose of the law that has been infringed and whether rejecting the claim would enhance that purpose b) any other relevant public policy on which the denial of the claim may have an impact c) whether the denial of the claim would be a proportionate response to the illegality.

The approach adopted in of Patel v Mirza demonstrates a shift from a rigid approach to a more flexible one which takes into consideration the peripheral circumstances of the case and is capable of producing more reasonable and pragmatic results.

Although the case of Patel v Mirza has been invoked in several first instance court decisions in Cyprus, to some of which, the invocation was indeed successful, it is apparent that the dominant approach regarding the  application of the illegality defence remains the one established by Holman v Johnson and Tinsley v Millingan. Of course, the fact that the Cyprus Court of Appeal has not yet been given the chance to apply or make holistic reference to the case of Patel v Mirza plays an important role to the reproduction of the strict approach established by the “reliance test”.

What is certainly inarguable is that the case of Patel v Mirza which has shown the “way forward” to a more liberal approach has not been overlooked by the Cyprus Courts. What remains to be seen is how this approach will affect and re-shape the application of the “illegality defence” in Cyprus law.

Follow Ioannides Demetriou LLC on LinkedIn for more articles by our lawyers, news and updates.

Navigating Trust Litigation Safely: Understanding Beddoe Orders

Posted on | by Paschalis Paschali

Trustees play a crucial role in managing trusts, ensuring the best interests of beneficiaries are upheld while navigating legal complexities. However, when trustees face litigation, the potential for personal liability can be a daunting prospect.

Indemnity out of the trust fund or personal liability?

Although the general rule of trust law is that a trustee is entitled to be indemnified out of the trust fund for any expenses or liabilities properly incurred on behalf of the trust, this general principle is only applicable when the trustee is acting properly and reasonably. Therefore, trustees may lose their right to protection from liability if it is found that they have brought, defended or continued proceedings unreasonably. As the trust lacks distinct legal identity, the proceedings typically involve actions either initiated by or directed against the trustee in their capacity as such and therefore trustees often litigate at their own risk as to costs.

Enter the Beddoe Order, a legal mechanism designed to protect trustees from such risks while safeguarding trust assets.

What is a Beddoe Order?

Named after the landmark case Re Beddoe (1893) 1 Ch 547, a Beddoe Order allows trustees to engage in legal proceedings in their capacity as trustees, ensuring that they will be reimbursed from the trust fund for any expenses incurred in the litigation. This order effectively shields trustees from personal liability and covers both the trustees’ own costs and the costs trustees are ordered to pay to third parties.

The primary reason for trustees to seek a Beddoe Order is to mitigate the personal financial risks associated with trust-related litigation. Without such protection, trustees could find themselves personally liable for legal costs if the court later deems their actions unjustified or not in the best interests of the trust.

Procedure for a Beddoe application

A Beddoe application should be brought by the trustee, before the latter embarks on any litigation. The application would normally be brought in separate proceedings by the alternative procedure provided by Part 8 of the New Civil Procedure Rules and pursuant to the provisions of the Cyprus International Trusts Law no. 69(I)/1992 as amended, which enables a trustee to seek the Court’s directions as to how they will act in relation to a particular matter.

The Court assesses the arguments presented by the trustee and any other parties to the Beddoe application, e.g. the beneficiaries, to determine whether initiating, defending, or continuing the underlying proceedings serves the overall interests of the beneficiaries. This decision involves discretionary judgment, with the Court having the freedom to consider any relevant factors. Specifically, the Court considers aspects such as the anticipated outcome and costs of the underlying proceedings, as well as the proceedings’ value to the trust.

Appropriateness of a Beddoe Order

However, a Beddoe application is not appropriate in all types of trust disputes. As per the distinction deriving from Alsop Wilkinson v. Neary [1996] 1 WLR 1220, there are three types of trust litigation:

(a) A third party dispute between trustees and third parties, for example for breach of contract between the trustee, in their capacity as trustee, and a third party.

A Beddoe application is more standardly used in third party disputes where in the normal course of events, a trustee acting reasonably would not bear the costs of the litigation personally.

(b) A trust dispute, namely a dispute concerning the trust and the trust assets. A trust dispute can be either ‘‘friendly’’ or ‘‘hostile’’.

Friendly claims are those who are deemed to be brought for the benefit of the trust fund as a whole and usually involve questions as to the proper construction of the trust instrument and questions arising in the course of the administration of the trust. Beddoe applications are considered appropriate in cases of friendly trust disputes.

On the other hand, hostile claims are usually third party claims alleging for example that trust assets should never have formed part of the trust fund or challenging the validity of the trust. A Beddoe application is rarely appropriate in the case of hostile trust disputes because the Court would first need to resolve the underlying dispute before deciding whether it is appropriate to determine the costs in advance.

(c) A beneficiaries dispute, i.e. a dispute between the trustee and one or more beneficiaries stemming from the trustee’s actions in administering the trust, for example, a beneficiary’s claim for breach of trust or for failure of the trustee to exercise their discretion or their duties.

As in the case of hostile trust disputes, by applying for a Beddoe Order in a beneficiaries dispute, the trustee is considered to be asking the Court to pre-empt the resolution of the underlying dispute and therefore, the appropriate course in such cases is to resolve the underlying dispute before determining the costs.

Can a trustee obtain Beddoe relief retrospectively?

Nevertheless, as it was decided in Blades v. Isaac [2016] EWHC 601 (Ch), the trustee’s failure to seek a Beddoe Order before embarking in litigation, does not prevent them from requesting a Beddoe Order and being indemnified from the assets of the trust at the end of the proceedings, once the issues at stake have been clarified.

As trust law evolves, the role of Beddoe orders continues to adapt to new challenges and legal interpretations. Recent developments in the UK and other common law jurisdictions indicate that courts are willing to grant Beddoe relief to trustees, provided that trustees act in the best interests of the trust overall when navigating legal proceedings and suggest an increased emphasis on transparency and accountability in trust administration.

Conclusion

Although in all common law jurisdictions, seeking for Beddoe relief is common practice, Cypriot courts have not yet thoroughly addressed the issue, possibly because of specific indemnity clauses in trust deeds. However, trustees should consider prudent to forego a Beddoe application only in circumstances where they already possess a distinct indemnity, specifically granted vis-a-vis the litigation in question. In the complex landscape of trust administration, Beddoe Orders serve as a crucial tool for trustees to navigate litigation safely while protecting trust assets and beneficiaries’ interests. By understanding the significance of Beddoe Orders and seeking them when necessary, trustees can fulfill their duties with confidence, without risking personal liability.

Ioannides Demetriou LLC: Top Tier Firm in the Legal500 EMEA 2024 rankings

Posted on | by Paschalis Paschali

March 2024: IOANNIDES DEMETRIOU LLC has achieved top honours in The Legal 500 EMEA 2024 Rankings.

With top rankings in Banking and Finance, Commercial, Corporate and M&A, Dispute Resolution, Real Estate and Construction, and EU and Competition, our people also received notable recognitions for which we are proud.

“The law firm of Ioannides Demetriou LLC has exceptional associates and partners. The associates of Ioannides Demetriou have extensive legal knowledge, are always eager to assist, prompt in their turnaround and a team with qualities that anyone is glad to work with.”

Chairman Pambos Ioannides is in the Hall of Fame for Corporate and M&A, a Leading Individual for Dispute Resolution, and Recommended for Banking & Finance, EU & Competition, and Real Estate and Construction.
Managing Director Andrew Demetriou is in the Hall of Fame for Real Estate & Construction, Dispute Resolution, and Recommended for Corporate and M&A, EU & Competition.
Partner Christina Ioannidou, is a Leading Individual for Banking & Finance, and Recommended for Corporate and M&A, Dispute Resolution, and EU & Competition.

Next Generation Partners: Katerina Hadjichristofi, Zoe Christou, Anna C. Christou, Savvas Yiordamlis, Theo Demetriou

Recommended Lawyers: Christos Frakalas, Demetris Kronides, Anna Christou, Nicolas Panayiotou, Elias Demetriou

Rising Star: Evie Constantinou

Note from the Editor at The Legal 500 Europe, Middle East and Africa (EMEA), Ella Marshall: “The EMEA guide provides researched coverage of over 80 countries and over 2,700 ranked law firms. Law firms pay nothing to participate and so we are free to make ranking decisions on merit alone.

Our research is conducted annually, providing a detailed qualitative assessment of various factors including work conducted by law firms over the past 12 months and historically; experience and depth of teams; specialisms and ancillary services; and, importantly, opinions of law firms’ clients – each year, The Legal 500 series contacts over 300,000 clients globally to obtain feedback on which law firms meet the criteria required by today’s in-house counsel and business leaders, wherever in the world their work takes them. All of this is used to benchmark each law firm versus competitors in the practice area in question.”

For more information contact us here.

The regulation of the content of B2C contracts under Cypriot contract law

Posted on | by Paschalis Paschali

Effective consumer protection is an area still in the earliest stages of its development in the Cypriot legal system. Prior to the adoption of Directive 93/13 which provided a substantive test of unfairness and which regulated the content of business contracts through ensuring that unfair terms not be considered binding to consumers, the Cypriot legal system did not provide for a level of consumer protection through statutory or case law. In essence, no measures existed aimed at protecting consumers against contract terms that had not been individually negotiated by consumers in advance and which in turn could grant a considerable advantage to businesses.


Such terms often come in the form of exclusion clauses which can exclude or restrict liability, make the liability or its enforcement subject to restrictive conditions, or exclude or restrict a person from pursuing a right or remedy. As the characteristic of an unfair term is one which increases the number or the difficulty of a party’s obligations, even a force majeure clause may come to be considered unfair if intentionally worded vaguely. If a seller can unilaterally determine a force majeure clause for example, then what is to prevent them from defining a reasonably foreseeable phenomenon as grounds for the removal of liability? Where standard form contracts were established to facilitate commercial transactions and better define the rights and obligations of the two parties, a unilateral approach to the definition of these terms by sellers would necessarily come at the cost of the consumer, who was faced with either accepting these terms or be deprived of the sought goods or services.


Prior to Directive 93/13, Cypriot consumers only had recourse to general principles of contract law and primarily procedural safeguards provided by the Contract Law, Cap. 149 i.e. the key law governing contracts in Cyprus. However and while generally sufficient, Cap. 149 was inadequate in providing the necessary tools in dealing with unfair contract terms, making the implementation of Directive 93/13 necessary for enhanced consumer protection.

Procedural Safeguards of Cap. 149


It could be argued that, in relation to regulating the use of unfair terms, the common law of contract is less concerned with the substance of the contract and more so with the procedure leading to its conclusion. If no illegality is found in what preceded the conclusion of the contract, which could in any way impact the will of the parties to be bound in contract, common law courts would hesitate in intervening since the determination of the substance of the contract remains, based on the principle of privity of contract, within the exclusive competence and autonomy of the parties.


As such, section 13 of Cap. 149, with its emphasis on the concurrence of wills, established that consent is considered a central concept of contract conclusion. If consent is considered to be given “freely”, then the contract is to be respected. With the intention to ensure this, section 14 of Cap. 149 codified a number of principles in order to safeguard that the parties’ consent is “free”, which include provisions on coercion, undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation and mistake.


Yet, beyond the rules established in section 14 emphasizing procedural fairness, Cap. 149 did not provide the necessary tools for examining the substantive unfairness of contract terms. Contrarily, while the Indian Contract Act introduced similar procedural rules, Indian courts also made use of the public policy exception under their section 23 (identical to section 23 of Cap. 149) to strike down contracts whose terms were labelled as contrary to public policy, thereby invoking the illegality of the contract’s object or consideration.


In conclusion, Cypriot law follows the general position of English contract law, where the latter has long taken the view that acceptance of the principles of freedom of contract, the binding force of contracts and the lack of a general principle of good faith and fair dealing precludes the review of the fairness of either the contract as whole or of its particular terms. This can most notably be seen in the instance of contract formation. While a promise could not be considered valid without the corresponding consideration, the acknowledgment of an inadequate or nominal consideration signifies that a substantive inequality of bargaining power is not seen as a ground for a vitiation of a contract.


As regards the fairness of particular contract terms, the common law approach can be illustrated most explicitly in its acceptance of the validity of exemption clauses. That is, when once agreed between the parties, knowingly or otherwise, these clauses can effectively exclude liability both in contract and in tort, severely impacting the balance of rights and obligations between the parties. However, beyond a favorable interpretation of the contract in favor of the weaker party in instances of inequality of bargaining power but also through the use of the contra preferentem principle in instances of ambiguity in interpretation of an exclusion clause, and save in instances of a fundamental breach of contract, the Cypriot contract law tools seemed inadequate in properly regulating the use of unfair terms.


Prior to the transposition of Directive 93/13, Cypriot courts had lacked the legal tools to confront the challenges that came with standard form contracts and in particular seemed unwilling to examine the parties’ initial allocation of risk, even if it was done unilaterally and in a standardized manner by one of the contracting parties. Instead of focusing on the pursuit of mutual assent, the courts were content with the finding of the external communication of intention by the parties through their signatures to the contract. Since both parties seemingly gave their consent to be bound by the contract, Cypriot courts appeared hesitant in interfering with its individual terms, beyond through the use of the above mentioned procedural safeguards in instances where the parties consent to be bound could be impacted. These legal circumstances are what justified the need for the implementation of Directive 93/13. It provided courts the ability to control unfair terms in consumer contracts, though the granting of discretionary power as to the interpretation of the substantive unfairness of contract terms through the control of their content. However, while there is still very limited Cypriot case law applying the Directive’s robust two-tiered unfairness test, it remains to be seen if future applications of this test by the Cypriot courts can promote effective consumer protection or if additional national legislation is required to this end.

–> Contact us here for any information on how we can assist you with the application of Directive 93/13 to your consumer contracts

The Sale of Land (Specific Performance) (Amending) Law of 2023 – Purchaser protection when the immovable property is encumbered by a pre-existing mortgage

Posted on | by Paschalis Paschali

This article is also available in Greek

On 12.12.2023, the Sale of Land (Specific Performance) (Amending) Law of 2023 (L. 132(I) of 2023) (hereinafter the “Amending Law of 2023”) was published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Cyprus.

The Amending Law of 2023 is read together with the Sale of Land (Specific Performance) Laws of 2011 to 2020 (hereinafter the “Main Law”), with the Amending Law of 2023 and the Main Law being referred to together as the “Sale of Land (Specific Performance) Laws of 2011 to 2023”.

This article briefly analyses a completely new procedure implemented by the Amending Law of 2023, which aims to provide preemptive protection with regards to the rights and interests of purchasers of immovable property, in cases where the immovable property happens to be encumbered by a pre-existing mortgage.

Formalities Necessary for the Lodging of a Contract in Cases where the Immovable Property Happens to be Encumbered by a Pre-Existing Mortgage

A key change introduced by the Amending Law of 2023 relates to the requirements that must be met for the lodging of a contract with the District Lands Office (“DLO”), in cases where the contract concerns immovable property encumbered solely by a pre-existing mortgage or contract and the registered owner of such is not subject to any restriction/prohibition.

In addition to the already existing requirements that have to be met for the lodging of a contract with the DLO to be accepted, as these are set out in sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of subsection (1) of section 3 of the Main Law, the lodging of a contract, in cases where the circumstances described above apply, now necessitates the inclusion of specific written declarations.

The Amending Law of 2023 specifies that the lodging of the contract will be accepted only if it is accompanied by the written declaration of each mortgagee and seller, in relation to which the purchaser confirms knowledge (according to Form A of the Annex), or the written declaration of the purchaser (according to Form C of the Annex).

Form A of the Annex

By means of Form A, the mortgagee and the seller undertake in writing that, if 95% of the contract amount, including any advance payment already received by the seller, is deposited by the seller and/or purchaser into a specific bank account (deposit account) maintained in the name of the seller, then a relevant payment certificate will be issued to the Purchaser immediately (in accordance with Form B of the Annex).

Form A records a commitment on the part of the mortgagee in that, upon payment of the aforementioned amount and issuance of Form B, it shall release or alleviate the immovable property from the encumbering mortgage, but also that, in case of failure on its part to do so, the purchaser shall have the ability to submit Form B with the Department of Lands and Surveys, duly signed and stamped by the mortgagee. In such an instance, the Director (Department of Lands and Surveys) shall proceed to transfer the immovable property into the name of the purchaser.

The purchaser, by signing Form A, certifies that they have received knowledge of the above commitments.

Furthermore, with relevant additions to Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Main Law, the Amending Law of 2023 explains the practical implementation of the procedure arising from Form A, the consequences that the mortgagee will face in case of non-compliance with its commitment and how the Director (Department of Lands and Surveys) can proceed to transfer the immovable property into the name of the purchaser upon being presented with a duly completed, signed and stamped Form B.

The introduction of Form A and the related procedure seeks to bring about the preemptive protection and safeguarding of interests. These new introductions act as a safeguard for the benefit of all parties involved and especially the purchaser, setting out precisely the actions that must be carried out by the seller and/or the purchaser for the mortgagee to comply with its simultaneously granted commitment to alleviate the property from the encumbering mortgage, as well as the procedures/consequences that may be implemented in case that the mortgagee fails to honour its commitment.

The procedure arising from Forms A and B ensures that the mortgaged property will be transferred freely to the purchaser, once the purchaser has fulfilled its contractual obligations towards the seller.

Form C of the Annex

Alternatively, the Amending Law of 2023 allows the lodging of a contract by including Form C, through which the purchaser essentially acknowledges the existence of an encumbering mortgage affecting the immovable property and assures that it wishes to proceed with the lodging of the contract without it being accompanied by Form A of the Annex.

Form C does not seek to safeguard purchaser rights to the same extent as Form A. In fact, Form C circumvents the whole procedure set out by Form A.

However, it cannot be overlooked that Form C also contributes to the advance safeguarding of purchaser interests by enabling a purchaser to become aware of the existence of an encumbering mortgage affecting the property in question, but also to confirm its willingness to proceed with the lodging of a contract without the use of Form A.

The introduction of Forms A, B and C of the Annex is undoubtedly a positive development, since it implements a new practice that seeks to safeguard the procedures related to purchasing and transferring of immovable property. In order to solve a serious problem that has arisen in recent years, Forms A, B and C aim to better inform and safeguard in advance the interests of a purchaser, who, despite having fulfilled its obligations towards a seller, ends up dealing with a seller who is unable to transfer the immovable property due to the existence of a mortgage.

Greater awareness of the parties involved and completion of real estate transactions without complications contribute to the strengthening of the real estate market, whilst at the same time inspire more confidence on the part of purchasers in relation to the legislative framework that governs the whole process in cases where the property for sale is encumbered by a mortgage.

Apart from the positive elements deriving from the introduction of Forms A, B and C of the Annex, we consider it appropriate to conclude with the following comments, which potentially reveal a need or improvement of the phrasing contained in the aforementioned Forms and clarification of the new procedure implemented by the Amending Law of 2023:

(i) The additional formalities introduced by the Amending Law of 2023 are not exclusive to cases where the property is only encumbered by a pre-existing mortgage. In fact, the Amending Law of 2023 expressly states that the additional formalities also apply to cases where the property is only encumbered by a pre-existing contract. Nonetheless, this does not seem to be reflected by the phrasing contained in Forms A, B and C, which deals exclusively with the case of a pre-existing mortgage, without containing any reference whatsoever in relation to a pre-existing contract.

(ii) Forms A, B and C refer only to seller and purchaser. This implies that these Forms apply only in cases involving the sale and purchase of immovable property. However, such an approach is incompatible with Article 2 of the Main Law and specifically with the definition of the term “contract”, which includes various types of contracts such as assignment, distribution, and exchange contracts.

(iii) Forms A, B and C require for the description of the purchased unit that has been erected and/or will be erected on the property to be recorded. Such phrasing does not seem to be consistent with cases where the contract does not relate to the purchasing of a unit but instead concerns the purchasing of a field or plot.

(iv) The mortgagee’s commitment provided through Forms A and B is conditional on the payment of 95% of the contract value to a predetermined deposit account. This means, however, that the mortgagee is not obliged to extinguish the mortgage, despite the whole value of the mortgage having been deposited, unless 95% of the contract value is first deposited in that account, an amount which may exceed the total value of the mortgage.

(v) Forms A, B and C refer to cases where the immovable property forming the object of the contract is affected by a pre-existing mortgage. Nevertheless, this wording is not consistent with cases where the object of a contract is only part of an immovable property, which part has no connection whatsoever with a pre-existing mortgage that happens to exist in relation to another part of the immovable property which is not for sale and belongs to another co-owner.

The issues raised through the above commentary are expected to be clarified and addressed over time. The Amending Law of 2023 is very recent and, therefore, the practical implementation and application of the procedure arising from Forms A, B and C cannot yet be properly evaluated.

According to information we have received from the Department of Lands and Surveys, it is expected that the officers of the District Land Registry Offices will be continuously provided with guidance and informative circulars, so as to be in a better position to provide information to the public with regards to the new procedures introduced through Forms A, B and C and their proper implementation, aiming to achieve the objectives of the Amending Law of 2023.

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